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Abstract: This paper investigates the leading causes of nonperforming loans during the 
economic and banking crises that affected a large number of countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the 1990s. Empirical analysis shows a dramatic increase in these loans and 
extremely high credit risk, with significant differences between the CFA and non-CFA 
countries, and substantially higher financial costs for the latter sub-panel of countries. 
The results also highlight a strong causality between these loans and, economic growth, 
real exchange rate appreciation, the real interest rate, net interest margins and interbank 
loans, consistent with the causality and econometric analysis, which reveal the 
significance of macro and microeconomic factors. Indeed, the dramatic increase in these 
loans is largely driven by macroeconomic volatility and reflects the vulnerability of 
undiversified African economies, which remain heavily exposed to external shocks. 
Simulated results show that macroeconomic stability and economic growth are associated 
with a declining level of nonperforming loans; whereas adverse macroeconomic shocks 
coupled with higher cost of capital and lower interest margins are associated with a rising 
scope of nonperforming loans. These results are supported by long-term estimates of 
nonperforming loans derived from pseudo panel-based prediction models.  
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Historically, the occurrence of banking crises has often been associated with a massive 
accumulation of nonperforming loans which can account for a sizable share of total assets of 
insolvent banks and financial institutions, especially during episodes of systemic crises.
2 
More recently, the apparent association between nonperforming loans and banking crises was 
further corroborated by the 1997 East Asian financial and banking crisis which left the four 
countries severely affected, with a more than threefold increase in their volume of 
nonperforming loans in the period leading up to the crisis. For instance, in Indonesia where 
over 60 banks collapsed during the crisis, nonperforming loans represented about 75% of 
total loan portfolios [Caprio and Klingebiel (2002)].
3 The banking crisis which affected a 
large number of Sub-Saharan African countries in the 1990s was also accompanied by a rapid 
accumulation of nonperforming loans.
4  
 
In spite of this apparent association between banking crises and nonperforming loans, the 
literature on banking crises has focused on the macroeconomic determinants of banking 
crises and less on the various sources of nonperforming loans, which are used as indicator 
variables to measure the intensity of the crisis, and may be viewed as one possible 
consequence of the crisis, rather than a critical factor leading to it.
5 This paper focuses on 
nonperforming loans in Sub-Saharan Africa. These loans are believed to have fueled the 
banking crisis which affected numerous banks and financial institutions in the sub-panels of 
CFA and non-CFA countries in the 1990s, causing a large number of banks, particularly the 
most affected, to be declared bankrupt, and others to undergo major financial and operational 
restructuring.  
 
Nonperforming loans generally refer to loans which for a relatively long period of time do 
not generate income; that is the principal and/or interest on these loans has been left unpaid 
for at least 90 days [Caprio and Klingebiel (1999)]. In the context of the Central Bank of 
West African States, Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO), the lead 
time from the status of standard to substandard loans (including doubtful and loss loans) is 
                                                           
2 Systemic banking crisis refers to a situation where problems banks account for at least 20 percent of total deposits of 
banks and financial institutions. Since the late 1970s, 114 episodes of systemic banking crises have occurred in 91 
countries [Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu (1997)]. 
3 Banking crisis fueled by nonperforming loans are common in developed countries as well. The scope of these loans is 
generally more important in developing and emerging market economies, however. For instance peak levels of 
impaired loans averaged 49 percent of total loans in Indonesia, 48 percent in Thailand; while impaired loans have 
remained consistently below 10 percent in Nordic and most industrial countries, including during the period of banking 
and financial crises [Alexander et al. (1997)]. 
4 For instance, at the peak of the financial crisis in Benin, 80 percent of total banks’ loans portfolios, about 17 percent 
of GDP, was non-performing in the late nineties [Kane and Rice (2001)]. 
5 For instance, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) classify episode of financial distress as full-fledged crisis if the 
ratio of nonperforming to total assets exceeds 10 percent.   3
much longer.
6 Substandard loans refer to loans which have been unpaid for six months at 
least and whose repayments cannot be undertaken by the debtor.
7 A different definition is 
used by the Central Bank of “Central African States”, Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale 
(BEAC) which considers as nonperforming all loans for which interest and/or principal have 
been left unpaid for a period of at least three months.
8 The criteria for identifying 
nonperforming loans is even more variable across Sub-Saharan Africa, if one takes into 
account the multiplicity of regulatory agencies and institutions across countries in the non-
CFA sub-panel and the marked difference in the level of minimum capital requirement in 
these countries [Bloem and Gorter (2001)].
9  However, the Basel II Commission emphasizes 
the need to evolve toward a standardized and internal rating-based approach. In practice, this 
Commission recommends to align banks’ capital requirements with prevailing modern risk 
management techniques [IIF (1999), BIS (2003)].
10 Moreover, to ensure comparability across 
banks, this Commission has established minimum qualifying criteria for the use of internal 
rating-based approaches that cover the comprehensiveness and integrity of banks’ internal 
credit risk assessment capabilities. For all practical purposes, the definition used in this study 
is based on a shorter lead time to the substandard loan status and classifies as nonperforming 
all loans left unpaid for a period of at least 90 days. 
 
The economic and financial costs of these impaired loans are significant.
11 Potentially, these 
loans may negatively affect the level of private investment, increase deposit liabilities and 
constrain the scope of bank credit to the private sector through a reduction of banks’ capital, 
following falling saving rates as a result of runs on banks, accumulation of losses and 
correlative increased provisions to compensate for these losses. These loans also have 
potential for reducing private consumption, and in the absence of deposit guarantee 
mechanisms to protect small depositors, can be a source of economic contraction, especially 
when coupled with declining gross capital formation in the context of a credit crunch caused 
by erosion of banks’ equity and assets.  
 
The fiscal costs of these impaired loans are important as well, and vary with the scope and 
length of the crisis [Cortavarria et al. (2000)].
12 The resolution of these loans is generally 
made through the creation of Asset Management Companies and/or deposit insurance 
schemes whose main function is to take over nonperforming assets of distressed financial 
institutions. In most countries, these Asset Management Companies and deposit insurance 
                                                           
6 BCEAO and BEAC were set up on the basis of two treaties establishing the Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine 
(UMOA), and a monetary co-operation between the Francophone states of Central and West Africa. 
7 By focusing on time and length of default, this definition allows classification of banks loans on the basis of their 
performances. Although practical, this definition fails to account for the relatively high degree of correlation between 
economic downturn and banking crisis. The risk exposure depends on the borrower, but also on its economic and brach 
of activity; the probability that a loan becomes nonperforming is higher when the economic branch in which the 
borrower exercises is exposed to unpredictable adverse shocks [Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1997)].  
8 The classification also varies according to the type of loans, and is much longer for real estate loans.  
9 Some countries use quantitative criteria to distinguish between “good” and “bad” loans (e.g., number of days of 
overdue schedule payments), while others rely on qualitative norms (such as the availability of information about the 
client’s financial status, and perspectives about future payments). 
10 Implementation of agreements under the Basel II Commission is ongoing. For the G10 countries, the transition 
toward the standardized and foundation for internal rating-based approaches is planned for year-end 2006.However, a 
more flexible approach is adopted for non-G10 countries whose banks are assisted by International Financial 
Institutions.  
11 “Impaired loans” is the accounting term for “nonperforming loans”, and is used interchangeably with the latter 
throughout this paper. 
12 A study by the World Bank reported that the fiscal cost in some cases was between 1 and 2 percent of GDP—1.5 
percent of GDP in Ghana, and 2.0 percent in Guinea, and much higher in other cases [Basu (1998)].    4
schemes are government-owned entities set up through the budget to provide financial 
assistance to problem banks [Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1997)].
13 The intervention of these 
Asset Management Companies in support of distressed financial institutions to avert banking 
crisis may therefore exacerbate the already high pressure on government revenues. This 
pressure is likely to be more important in Sub-Saharan Africa where most countries are 
confronted with a narrow fiscal base and limited prospects for increased domestic resource 
mobilization. 
 
When left unsolved, nonperforming loans can compound into financial crisis, the moment 
these loans exceed bank capital in a relatively large number of banks. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the probability of a banking crisis occurring may be even more important because 
nonperforming loan-related risks are compounded by the structure of the banking system 
which is dominated by a few large banks.
14 To the extent that the outbreak of banking crises 
is associated with rising scope of nonperforming loans, understanding the leading causes of 
these loans may be critical to improving the soundness of banks and financial institutions, 
and hence private investment and economic growth. However, despite the implications of 
nonperforming loans for banking crisis, for investment and economic growth, and for 
anticipating future banking and financial crises, the leading causes of these loans remain 
unknown for most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This paper investigates the micro and 
macroeconomic factors that led to the dramatic rise of nonperforming loans in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the 1990s using pseudo-panel econometric models and discusses the 
macroeconomic implications of these loans for Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of 
the scope and trend of nonperforming loans in Sub-Saharan Africa, contrasting the CFA 
countries which operate under fixed exchange rate regimes with their currency pegged to the 
French franc, with non-CFA countries subject to flexible exchange regimes.
15 Section III 
investigates the determinants of nonperforming loans using correlation and causality analysis. 
The results highlight the significance of moral hazard, interbank loans, and a number of 
macroeconomic variables, including real interest rate, per capita GDP growth and inflation, 
which Granger-cause nonperforming loans. Section IV discusses the methodology for 
econometric estimation and provides an overview of the panel-based prediction model used 
in the context of this study. The results and macroeconomic implications of impaired loans 
for Sub-Saharan African countries are discussed in Section V. In particular, under fixed 
effects specification, the results support the significance of macroeconomic factors. Among 
these factors, GDP per capita and real effective exchange rates appear to have played a key 
role in the rapid accumulation of nonperforming loans in the 1990s, reflecting the extreme 
vulnerability of undiversified African economies to adverse macroeconomic shocks. Real 
exchange rate appreciation is particularly robust in explaining the proportional variance of 
nonperforming loans in the CFA sub-panel, through the balance of payments channels. At the 
microeconomic level, net interest margins and interbank loans are among the most significant 
                                                           
13 The financial assistance provided by governments can take several forms, including a recapitalization schemes, 
acquisition of bad loans, assisted mergers and liquidity support. 
14 In Benin for instance, the whole banking system, which was dominated by three banks, collapsed when 
nonperforming loans averaged over 80% of banks’ loans portfolio in the late eighties. 
15 Franc CFA refers to the Franc of African Financial Community or “Franc de la Communauté Financiere Africaine” 
(FCFA). The FCFA is used in 14 Sub-Saharan African countries (mostly former French colonies). These countries have 
their currency pegged to the defunct French franc; BCEAO and BEAC are the two Regional Central Banks for West 
and Central Africa, respectively.   5
predictors of nonperforming loans, reflecting the relatively low level of bank equity. Section 
VI provides some concluding remarks. 
 
II.  Nonperforming Loans in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
During the late 1980s and most of the 1990s, a large number of countries underwent episodes 
of systemic and borderline banking and financial crises across the developing world.
16 These 
crises, varying in scope across countries, were largely characterized by the poor performance 
of banking and financial institutions. They were largely associated with a rapid accumulation 
of nonperforming loans in the banking industry and a deterioration of asset quality in the face 
of increased credit risks. Over the decade spanning most of the 1990s, the scope of these 
loans increased significantly to reach over 30 percent of total loans in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The peak was achieved in 1993, when they reached 32 percent of total loans, the highest in 
the developing world. Indeed, even during the height of the Asian Financial crisis in 1997, 
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Figure 1 compares the trend of nonperforming loans in three regions of the developing world: 
Asia, Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Solid dark line refers to Sub-Saharan Africa, light 
gray line refers to Asia and doted dark line refers to Middle East. The graphs show a massive 
accumulation of nonperforming loans in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the early 90s, an 
indication of poor asset quality and high credit risks. Expressed as a percentage of total loans, 
Sub-Saharan Africa recorded the highest share of these loans throughout the first half of the 
                                                           
16 However, while much has been written about these crises in Latin America and Asia, the literature on banking crises 
in Sub-Saharan Africa has remained scant, see for instance Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1997) for the financial crises in 
Latin America, and International Monetary Fund (1999) for the Asian financial crisis.   6
nineties, and up to 1997 during the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. However, since 
then, that share has been declining steadily. By 2002, it accounted for about 12 percent of 
total loans, below the level observed in Middle East and Asia.
17 Although, nonperforming 
loans remain relatively high compared to estimates recorded in industrial countries where 
credit risk is generally below 10 percent [Barth and Nolle (1997)], this represents a 
significant improvement, reflecting the implementation of banking and financial sector 
restructuring undertaken in a number of countries, and direct capital infusion and government 
support largely in the form of acquisition of bad loans at a discounted price [Basu (1998)].  
 
Notwithstanding the relative decline of these impaired loans— sign of a relative 
improvement of banks position— the financial costs and implications of these loans remain 
far too important with lasting consequences for most of the heavily indebted poor countries 
and small economies of Sub-Saharan Africa. In dollar terms, the financial costs of these loans 
exceeded US$6 billion in Sub-Saharan African countries in 2002. Though the overall 
estimated dollar amount associated with these loans is much higher in other regions of the 
developing world, their share of GDP is significantly much smaller, especially for Asia, 
owning to the smaller size of the economy for most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where 
on the aggregate these loans account for about 2% of GDP [Basu (1998)].
18   
 
The dynamics of these impaired loans shows important disparities between countries in the 
CFA and non-CFA sub-panels, with significantly higher costs for the latter panel. Figure 2 
compares the trend of these loans in the sub-panels of CFA and non-CFA countries. The solid 
and dark line refers to averages across countries in the CFA sub-panel and the light gray line 
refers to averages across countries in the non-CFA sub-panel. While the financial costs of 
these loans grew consistently for countries in the non-CFA sub-panel over most of the 90s, 
increasing from less than US$50 millions in 1993 to over US$6 billion dollars in 1999, 
before tapering off thereafter, a reversal in the rising trend was observed in 1996 for countries 
in the CFA sub-panel, largely reflecting the exchange rate effects following the nominal 
devaluation of the CFA franc. 
 
The dramatic increase in the financial costs of these loans during the period preceding the 
devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 was followed by a steady decline afterward.
19 
Correlatively, between 1996 and 2002, the financial costs of these loans for countries in the 
CFA sub-panel failed from over US$275 millions to less than US$200 millions, leaving still 
a considerable gap between the sub-panel of CFA and non-CFA countries. The declining 
trend was of short span however. Since 1999, the estimated costs of these loans have been on 
the rise. The latest figures indicate that they increased from less than US$150 millions to over 
US$200 million between 1999 and 2002. 
 
This large gap is probably a reflection of the size of these economies, the structure of the 
banking system, and the difference in the scope of the crisis across the CFA and non-CFA 
                                                           
17 Note that the cross-over path between Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, where a declining trend in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is mirrored by a rising trend in Asia, occurs in 1997 during the Asian financial crises. In a number of countries, 
Indonesia and Thailand, nonperforming loans accounted for about 50 percent of total loans during that crisis 
[Alexander et al. (1997), Cortavarria et al. (2000)]. 
18 The estimated costs are around US$17.6 billion for Middle East and over US$41 billion for Asia, accounting for 
2.6% of GDP and 0.0015% of GDP, respectively. 
19 The CFA franc which has been pegged to the French franc at the fixed parity of 1 French franc to 50 CFA franc since 
1945 underwent a 100 percent devaluation in 1994, establishing the new parity of 1 French franc to 100 CFA franc. For 
further details see [Tchundjang Pouémi (1979), Monga and Tchatchouang (1996) and Monga (1997)].   7
sub-panels. The countries which were most affected by the crisis included Benin, Cameroon, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Swaziland.
20 In most of these countries, banks 
witnessed a dramatic erosion of their equity and capital. For instance, at the end of 1996, 
these loans accounted for over 30 percent of total loans in Cameroon; in Guinea-Bissau, they 
accounted for over 45 percent of commercial banks’ total loans portfolios in 1995; in Kenya, 
financial institutions accounting for over 30 percent of total assets faced solvency problems 
between 1993 and 1995.
21 Interesting enough, the countries most affected by the crisis also 
exhibited the lowest ratio of equity to liquid assets, an indication of a fragility of banks, 
which often resort to short-term financing. In particular, Swaziland and Benin have the 
lowest ratio; about 14% and 20%, respectively (see Table 1 in the Annex). 
 
The financial cost of the crisis was variable across countries. For instance, in Kenya, the 16 
distressed financial institutions closed or taken over by the Central Bank of Kenya in the 
early 90s had assets and deposits of about US$370 million and total losses of about US$158 
millions.
22 In Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire where the magnitude of the crisis was also 
significant, the estimated losses were much smaller in absolute terms, yet much higher when 
expressed in terms of GDP, reflecting the size of these economies. They accounted for over 
17 percent of GDP in Senegal and about 25 percent of GDP in Côte d’Ivoire in the late 80s 




Figure 2: Non-Performing Loans (in Millions of US dollar) in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
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20 The magnitude and length of the crisis was particularly significant in countries which experienced systemic financial 
crises in the 1980s and 1990s (Cameroon, Kenya and Senegal) and during most of the 1990s (DRC and Nigeria). 
21 In Senegal, about 50 percent of banking system loans was nonperforming in the late 80s and early 90s [Husain and 
Faruqee (1994)]. 
22 For further details, see Central Bank of Kenya Monthly Economic Review (1995).  
23 Although most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were affected in the 90s, the financial crisis broke out much earlier in 
a number of countries, including Benin (1988), Equatorial Guinea (1983), Tanzania (1987), and Senegal (1988). The 
crisis had a devastating effect in Senegal where six commercial banks and one development bank accounting for over 
30% of financial system assets were forced to close.    8
 
 
The structure and composition of these nonperforming loans comprises of investment in 
speculative projects, loans extended to real estate development and short-term loans to 
finance investment projects that could not generate enough income in the short run to cover 
interest payments. During the economic crisis fueled by the deterioration of terms of trade 
and exogenous shocks (falling commodity prices), which affected numerous countries in the 
1990s, banks accumulated a sizable share of impaired loans to agricultural and export sectors 
in the form of credit facilities for trade and direct investment. For instance, banking and 
financial institutions, which suffered heavy losses, were the leading cocoa and coffee 
exporters in Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, two agrarian-based economies which derive a 
sizable share of export earnings from agriculture. These countries experienced a significant 
deterioration of terms of trade during the crisis period.
24 
 
There are several other explanations for the rise of impaired loans in the 1990s: the chronic 
fiscal deficits and balance of payment difficulties in numerous countries, the mismatch 
between the maturities of assets and liabilities, which led numerous banks and financial 
institutions to resort to highly-priced short-term financing in the form of interbank loans. The 
demand for highly-priced short-term loans further exacerbated the crisis and the 
accumulation of impaired loans. In some of the most affected countries where governments 
were the main shareholders, a sizable share of impaired loans was owed by state governments 
and government agencies and institutions. This was quite common across Sub-Saharan Africa 
during most of the 1980s and 1990s where commercial banks were heavily involved in the 
financing of government fiscal deficits and loss-making public enterprises [Basu (1998)]. 
 
The depth of the banking crisis is further illustrated by the deterioration of banks assets, 
proxy by the capital asset ratio, a measure of asset quality. This ratio provides the cushion to 
absorb shocks in crisis periods; a large value of this ratio is an indication of a relative 
soundness of banks and financial institutions. While the overall estimate for this ratio exceeds 
the 8 percent minimum requirement— set within the framework of International Settlement 
Standards— for a number of countries, this threshold is not met, especially in the CFA sub-
panel of countries where the overall average is about 7 percent. This ratio is slightly higher in 
the sub-panel of non-CFA countries which have an overall average above 15 percent (see 
Table I). The difference between the sub-panels of CFA and non-CFA countries is preserved 
when conditioned upon the ownership structure of banks (public versus private). For 
publicly-owned banks, the capital asset ratio is 29 percent for countries in the non-CFA sub-
panel, about twice the level in the CFA sub-panel of countries. Surprisingly, for privately-
owned financial institutions, these ratios are much lower, 14 percent for the sub-panel of non-
CFA and about 7 percent for the sub-panel of CFA (see Table 2 in the Annex).  
 
The relatively low capital to asset ratio among private banks illustrates the magnitude of 
credit risks to financial institutions and the relatively low level of equity, a constraint to the 
constitution of provisions against future losses and potential risks. Indeed, the ratio of 
nonperforming loans to loan loss reserves and provisions is much higher for privately owned 
banks and financial institutions across Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, while these loans 
account for over 450 percent of loans loss reserves for all privately-owned financial 
                                                           
24 Terms of trade deterioration were estimated to about 56 percent in Cameroon in the late 1980s and over 27 percent in 
Côte d’Ivoire in the early 1990s.   9
institutions; they account for about 190 percent for publicly-owned financial institutions. 
Irrespective of the ownership structure, the gap between countries in the sub-panels of CFA 
and non-CFA remains important. For privately-owned financial institutions, this ratio varies 
between 350 percent for non-CFA to over 570 percent for the CFA sub-panel, implying that 
either nonperforming loans are much higher in the CFA sub-panel and/or provisions for 
losses are kept low to artificially inflate the capital base of banks. However, given the 
significantly higher financial costs of these loans and their magnitude for non-CFA countries, 





Table I: Banks Portfolio and Assets Structure in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Averages over 1993-2002) 
 





Benin  1.706 7.127 0.070 0.015  2.896  0.926 
Botswana  1.157 3.653 0.196 0.045  1.698  0.801 
Cameroon  ..  1.603 0.063 0.001  1.874  0.916 
Cape  Verde 2.639 5.000 0.079 0.012  2.470  0.852 
Chad  1.000 0.250 0.139 0.011  1.288  0.871 
Côte  d’Ivoire  1.894 3.333 0.090 0.012  1.195  0.904 
Ethiopia  1.140 1.917 0.099 0.015  2.596  0.702 
Kenya  2.787 6.532 0.148 0.016  1.489  0.849 
Malawi  2.167 0.833 0.139 0.021  2.766  0.813 
Mali  1.385 12.679 0.093  0.008  1.662  0.944 
Rwanda  1.867 1.500 0.113 0.015  1.861  0.874 
Senegal  2.585 2.473 0.082 0.011  1.516  0.893 
South  Africa  1.316 3.234 0.325 0.030  1.679  0.660 
Swaziland  1.891 5.500 0.059 0.001  9.728  0.636 
Togo  1.517 3.973 0.109 0.015  1.548  0.917 
Zimbabwe  1.056 3.387 0.205 0.041  1.985  0.727 
All CFA  1.681  4.491  0.092  0.010  1.711  0.910 
All  Non-CFA  1.780 3.321 0.151 0.022  2.919  0.768 
All SSA  1.740 3.833 0.126 0.017  2.391  0.830 
 
 
The scope of nonperforming loans is particularly high for banks and financial institutions, 
which have loans portfolios skewed toward manufacturing, commerce, and services. This is 
particularly the case for member countries of the West African Monetary Union. 
Consistently, nonperforming loans to these three sectors account for over 75% of problems 
loans [UMOA (2000, 2001)]. Moreover, these loans have short term maturity and are largely 
directed toward commerce, which accounts for over 40 percent of total impaired loans. 
Although the pattern and trend are consistent across countries, the contribution of these three 
sectors to the growth of impaired loans is more important in Benin where it averages 90% 
over the 90s. The distribution across sectors is also variable; nonperforming loans to services 
have longer maturity and are higher in Burkina Faso and Benin. Expressed as a percentage of 
total impaired loans, they range from 15 to 29% in Burkina Faso and from 28 to 39% in 
                                                           
25 In spite of the relative increase in the level of provisions in the sub-panel of CFA countries, members of the Central 
African Monetary Union (BEAC), the coverage ratio which was below 50 percent in the early 1990s, increased to over 
60 in the second half of the 1990s, a level that remains relatively low, however [COBAC (1996, 1998)].   10
Benin [UMOA (2001)]. The share of nonperforming loans to the service sector is much lower 
in other countries, especially in Mali, where it consistently accounts for less than 10% of the 
total portfolios of problems loans. Most impaired loans in this country are owed to the 
agricultural and fishing sectors, which account for 53 percent of all problems loans [UMOA 
(2001)], a reflection of high vulnerability of banks to undiversified economies.  
 
 
III.  Determinants of Nonperforming Loans: Stylized Facts and Causal Analysis 
 
The accumulation of nonperforming loans is generally attributable to a number of factors, 
including economic downturns and macroeconomic volatility, terms of trade deterioration, 
high interest rates, excessive reliance on overly high-priced interbank borrowings, insider 
lending and moral hazard [Goldstein and Turner (1996)].
26 In a context of low equity and 
absence of diversification, terms of trade deterioration and interbank loans played a key role 
in the accumulation of nonperforming loans in Sub-Saharan Africa. The latter also increased 
the risks and prospects of moral hazard. Moral hazard in the banking sector context refers to 
the adverse incentives created by the prospects of implicit coverage of banks losses by 
governments. It can be particularly high when banks’ capitalization is low; in such cases, it 
often leads to adoption of imprudent lending strategies with direct implications for banks’ 
loans portfolios which tend to be heavily skewed toward high risk projects. When these 
projects are owned by investors and entrepreneurs directly or indirectly connected with the 
lenders, the financial transaction is termed as insider lending.
27  
 
The minimum capital requirement for banks remains relatively low during most of the 80s 
and beyond, a deliberate policy adopted by countries in support of the emergence of a 
domestic banking system. In light of the inverse relationship between moral hazard and 
banks’ capital, this deliberate policy exacerbated the banking crises and its inherent costs for 
Sub-Saharan African countries, however [Brownbridge (1998)].
28 Indeed, moral hazard was 
pervasive in the practice of banking in the nineties, and at such was singled out as one of the 
leading causes of a dramatic increase of nonperforming loans. In Nigeria for instance, moral 
hazard which fueled insider lending is believed to have accounted for over 65 percent of 
impaired loans in four banks liquidated in 1995. Similarly, most of large local banks failures 
in Kenya involved extensive insider lending [Bronwbridge (1998)].  
 
This section investigates the determinants of nonperforming loans using correlation and 
causality analysis. The analysis is based on data drawn from 16 African countries (7 CFA and 
9 non-CFA). The sub-panel of CFA countries includes: (1) Benin, (2) Cameroon, (3) Chad, 
                                                           
26 With the distressed financial system, interbank borrowings became the source of funds for most financial institutions. 
In Nigeria for instance, two of the failed Merchant banks had mobilized 84% and 68% of their total deposit liabilities 
from interbank deposits, respectively [Manu (1994)], a situation that led to rapid increase in interest rate. Real interest 
rates at over 20 percent were not uncommon for interbank borrowings. 
27 Insider lending is not specific to Sub-Saharan Africa however; over the years, it has been singled out as the major 
cause of banks failure around the world [Caprio (1997)]. 
28 For instance, during that period, the minimum capital requirement was less than US$50,000 in smaller countries and 
no more than half a million dollars in larger economies such as Kenya and Nigeria. However, an increase in the capital 
requirement and banks capitalization was part of the restructuring measures. Over the past few years, capital 
requirements have been significantly increased in most countries. For instance, in Kenya, all banks were obliged to 
raise their minimum capitalization from US$1.2 million to US$3.2 million in 1999. Since then this amount has been 
increased further. Similar measures were undertaken in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In late 2004, the Central 
Bank of Nigeria announced a new minimum capital requirement of over US$180 million, representing more than 
1150% increase from its previous level of US$14.5 millions.   11
(4) Cote d’Ivoire, (5) Mali, (6) Senegal and (7) Togo. The sub-panel of non-CFA countries 
includes: (8) Botswana, (9) Cape Verde, (10) Ethiopia, (11) Kenya, (12) Malawi, (13) 
Rwanda, (14) South Africa, (15) Swaziland and (16) Zimbabwe. The sample selection is 
dictated by the scope of the database and availability of financial information on these 
countries.
29 The data are provided on an annual basis end-of-period, between 1993 and 2002, 
included. The minimum length of the panel covers a period of 3 years for the shortest series 
(Chad and Rwanda), and up to 10 years for the longest series, producing an unbalanced 
panel.  
 
The correlation and causality analysis focuses on a number of macroeconomic and 
microeconomic (banking-sector) variables. At the macroeconomic level, the study 
investigates the correlation between nonperforming loans and a subset of economic variables: 
per capita GDP, inflation, interest rates, changes in the reel exchange rate, interest rate spread 
and broad money supply (M2). At the microeconomic level, it focuses on the association 
between nonperforming loans and banking-sector variables. The key banking variables 
include return on asset and equity, net interest margins and net income, and interbank loans. 
These variables are chosen in light of theoretical considerations and subject to data 
availability. Nonperforming loans are adjusted for specific provisions (nonperforming loans 
as a proportion of loans loss provisions) to provide the basis for cross-country comparisons.  
 
For a full coverage, the analysis is carried out for all banks, public and privately-owned 
banks (see Table II). A disaggregation along the lines of CFA and non-CFA sub-panels is 
also considered to capture regional effects of banking crises (see Table 3 and 4 in the Annex). 
The results show a negative association between real GDP per capita and nonperforming 
loans expressed as a percentage of loans loss provision. This implies that falling per capita 
income is associated with rising scope of nonperforming loans. To the extent that changes in 
per capita income is proxy for changes in economic growth, the negative association with 
nonperforming loans may reflect the impact of cyclical output downturns on the banking 
sector; a result that is expected in the literature [Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999)]. The sign of 
the coefficient is consistent across state and private banks, though the magnitude of the 
correlation is stronger for state banks and financial institutions.  
 
The study also investigates the association between nonperforming loans and, domestic 
credit, broad money supply (M2) and inflation. Though the magnitude of the coefficient of 
correlation between inflation and nonperforming loans is low, the sign is negative; 
unexpected rise in inflation under cyclical downturns is likely to negatively affect the 
performance of the banking sector and recovery of loans to private operators and investors. In 
the extreme case, hyper-inflation may erode banks assets and equity and weaken banks 
position through the interest rate channel. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is 
relatively low, and may reflect the general context of declining inflationary pressures in the 
nineties, especially in the sub-panel of CFA countries.
30  
 
The results also show a positive association between real exchange rate appreciation and 
nonperforming loans. The magnitude of this association is particularly strong in the sub-panel 
of CFA countries, which underwent a devaluation of their currency in the early nineties. Real 
                                                           
29 Bankscope collects data on individualized banks portfolio and assets structure, including nonperforming loans. 
30 With few exceptions, the average CPI inflation rate was relatively low in the CFA monetary zone, which offers a 
limited room for independent monetary policy, and hence little scope for inflation through money supply [Husain and 
Faruqee (1994), Monga and Thatchouang (1996)].   12
exchange rate appreciation may limit growth prospects by squeezing profit margins, 
especially in export-oriented industries, and ultimately lead to economic contraction with 
direct implications on loans performance [Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996)].
31 The direction of 
the association between real exchange rate appreciation and nonperforming loans is not 
consistent throughout the sample, however. This relationship is ambiguous for the sub-panel 
of non-CFA countries. In spite of its magnitude, the coefficient associated with these 
countries has a negative sign. Clearly, while the sign and direction of the association with 
banking crisis in the period preceding the crises may be anticipated, the response of monetary 
authorities is likely to affect the nature of this relationship over the crisis period, and may 
partly explain the ambiguous nature of the relationship in this sub-panel. 
 
 
Table II: Correlation Analysis between Nonperforming Loans (in % of loan loss provision) 
and Selected Banking and Macroeconomic Variables 
 
 
Variables  All Banks  State Banks  Private Banks 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES      
  Real GDP growth rate  0.19  -0.32  0.09 
  Real GDP per capita  -0.22  -0.63  -0.22 
  M2 in % of GDP  -0.03  0.07  -0.07 
  CPI inflation rate  -0.13  0.11  -0.17 
  GDP deflator inflation rate  0.01  0.19  -0.28 
  Domestic credit provided by banks (in % of GDP)  0.11  0.42  -0.11 
  Real interest rate  -0.14  0.00  0.09 
  Interest rate spread  -0.20  0.29  -0.14 
  Real GDP growth rate 2  0.24  -0.33  0.16 
  Real GDP per capita 2  -0.22  -0.60  -0.20 
  CPI inflation rate 2  -0.13  0.11  -0.17 
      
BANKING VARIABLES      
  Equity (in % of total asset)  -0.01  -0.49  0.13 
  Return on asset  -0.14  -0.59  -0.28 
  Total deposit (in % of total assets)  -0.12  -0.18  0.11 
  Total deposit (in % of total liabilities)  0.01  0.28  -0.08 
  Return on equity  -0.29  -0.70  -0.17 
  Net interest margin  -0.26  -0.60  -0.13 
  Net income (in % of total revenue)  -0.11  -0.47  -0.27 
 
 
Equally interesting is the relationship between broad money multipliers (M2) and 
nonperforming loans, and the potential association between banking crisis and domestic 
credit to the private sector. Theoretically, credit to the private sector is expected to grow 
more rapidly in the periods preceding the crises. However, the lending boom in the pre-crisis 
period is generally followed by a fall in domestic credit in the outbreak of the crisis [Gavin 
and Hausman (1995)]. With falling domestic credit, financial intermediation, measured by 
the ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP, is expected to be low, suggesting a negative 
                                                           
31 There are other indirect channels through which the economy and the banking sector can be affected: the exchange 
rate regime can undermine bank soundness through its impact on vulnerability to speculative attacks, a downward 
adjustment in the real value of bank capital, and the ability of the central bank to act as lender of last resort.    13
association between nonperforming loans and M2. Consistent with theoretical underpinnings, 
a large number of countries, especially the most affected ones (Benin, Cameroon and Côte 
d’Ivoire) witnessed a significant decline in the volume of credit to private sector during the 
banking crisis in most of the 90s [Daumont et al. (2004)].  
 
Indeed, the data analysis shows a negative association between monetary expansion— proxy 
by credit to the private sector— and nonperforming loans. This result is consistent across the 
sub-panels of CFA and non-CFA countries. It is particularly robust for CFA countries, which 
have a relatively high coefficient of correlation (see Table 3 in the Annex). However, the 
results are more ambiguous for state-owned banks, which exhibit a positive association 
between domestic credit and nonperforming loans. This may suggest that numerous problems 
banks owed by governments continued to operate and contribute to the growth of domestic 
credit; and to the extent that state-owned banks have traditionally been among the largest in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the negative association may reflect the delay in the implementation of 
financial and operational restructuring measures and the “too large to fail” policy that 
prolong the life of banks and financial institutions which otherwise would be declared 
bankrupt [Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1997)].  
 
At the microeconomic level, the correlation analysis shows a negative association between 
nonperforming loans and most banking variables, including return on asset and equity, total 
deposit, net interest margin and net income (see Table II). This result is consistent for most 
countries in the sub-panel of CFA and non-CFA countries (see Table 3 and 4 in Annex), and 
between state and privately-owned banks. For instance, the coefficient of correlation between 
return on asset and nonperforming loans is about -14 percent for all banks; it is higher in 
absolute terms for private banks (-28 percent) and state banks (-59 percent). A coefficient of 
correlation this high suggests that about 60 percent of variations in the scope of 
nonperforming loans are explained by changes in return on assets. However, a correlation 
analysis does not necessarily imply causation.  
 
The correlation analysis is further complemented by a Granger Causality to investigate the 
direction of and a possible causal relationship between a number of key explanatory variables 
and nonperforming loans.
32 A time series v is said to Granger-cause w if statistically 
significantly better predictions of w can be made by including lagged values of v in the 
conditioned information set in addition to lagged values of w [Granger (1969), Agénor and 
Taylor (1992)]. Let  t w ~  be the vector of nonperforming loans transformed to stationarity and 
t v ~  the value of a given explanatory variable taken at time t  ) 0 ( T t ≤ < , the length of the 
time series. The vector  t v ~  is said to Granger-cause  t w ~  if lagged values of  t v ~ ,  ) ~ ~ ( ) ( l t t v v l − =  
significantly help in the prediction of  t w ~ , given lagged value of  t w ~ . Formally, the Granger 
test of causality can be analyzed from the following bivariate representation:  
 
t l t l t l t l t t w w v v v ε β β α α α + + + + + + + = − − − − ) ( ) 1 ( 1 ) ( ) 1 ( 1 0
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ L L                                (1) 
 
t l t l t l t l t t v v w w w μ β β α α α + + + + + + + = − − − − ) ( ) 1 ( 1 ) ( ) 1 ( 1 0
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ L L                              (2) 
 
                                                           
32 The standard Granger-causality test is designed to analyze bivariate stationary stochastic processes.   14
The explanatory variable is represented in a synthetic form and could take on the 
representation  ) ~ ( it v  where the subscript i in turn represents macroeconomic and 
microeconomic level variables and t is the length of the series. The variables  t ε  and  t μ  are 
vectors of error terms. A causal relationship exists between  ) ~ , ~ ( t t v w  if at least one of the 
estimated regression coefficients 0 ≠ l β  in equation (2),  ) 0 ( n l ≤ <  where n is the 
maximum number of lags in the model.
33 This implies 
that ) ~ | ~ ( ) ~ , ~ | ~ ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − ≠ t t t t t w w f v w w f . In other words, understanding the dynamics of 
nonperforming loans would be improved by conditioning on a number of explanatory 
variables. 
 
The Granger-Causality test is applied to the sample of countries. The results are provided in 
Table 5a and 5b in the Annex. At the macroeconomic level, inflation, real interest rate, 
growth rate of GDP per capita are Granger-causal to nonperforming loans across most 
countries. In a number of countries, the F-Statistics is extremely large, with the null 
hypothesis of lack of causality rejected at 1 per cent level of significance. This is particularly 
the case for Cameroon and Chad. For these countries, the significance of real interest rate in 
the prediction of nonperforming loans reflects the prohibitively high level of interest rates 
which came with banks deregulation in the 80s. The positive covariance structure between 
real interest rates appreciation and rise of nonperforming loans is expected and has been 
observed in other parts of the world [Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1997)].
34 Indeed, interest rate 
liberalization increases the costs of funds and nurtures the culture of high-risk behavior; and 
to mitigate risks, higher rates are charged to high-risk borrowers, hence further increasing 
banks overall exposure.  
 
The coefficient associated with inflation is also significant in most countries, implying that 
inflation Granger-causes nonperforming loans. Indeed, inflation is one of the most significant 
macroeconomic variables in Chad, Kenya and Zimbabwe. The coefficient associated with 
this predictor has the largest F-Statistics in these three countries. While the significance of 
this variable in Zimbabwe may reflect the hyper-inflation context fueled among others by 
acute shortage of supply partly driven by the dramatic economic and political crisis in the late 
90s and beyond, its significance in Chad, a CFA country, may reflect inflationary pressures 
in the aftermath of the CFA devaluation in the mid-90s. In some of these countries, inflation 
is thought to have contributed to a rapid erosion of banks assets [Brownbridge (1998)]. 
 
However, in few countries, inflation and real interest rate are not particularly significant and 
do not appear to Granger-cause nonperforming loans. For these countries, the dynamics of 
nonperforming loans is best explained by the growth rate of GDP. For instance, in Botswana 
where growth rate of GDP Granger-causes nonperforming loans, the F-Statistics has an 
extremely large value. The Granger test also reveals a dual causality between growth rate of 
GDP per capita and nonperforming loans, implying that economic contraction and cyclical 
downturns may negatively affect banks portfolio, possibly leading to a deterioration of asset 
quality and accumulation of impaired loans. Conversely, banking crisis and accumulation of 
                                                           
33 A two-way causation is also possible and may occur if at least one of the  l β ˆ  in equation (1) is different from 0. 
34 In a study on the determinants of banking system fragility in Mexico, Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. found that high and 
prohibitive interest rate tend to lower the survival time of problems banks.    15
nonperforming loans may contribute to economic downturns, possibly through the saving-
investment link channels and/or the fiscal channel.  
 
At the microeconomic level, measures of profitability (net interest margins and returns on 
assets) play a key role in explaining the causal link between nonperforming loans and 
banking sector variables. In particular, net interest margin is significant across the sub-panel 
of CFA and non-CFA countries, and Granger-causes nonperforming loans at one and in some 
cases up to two lags (see Tables 5a and 5b in Annex). This variable is significant at 1 percent 
level. Similarly, the variable returns on assets Granger-causes nonperforming loans in most 
countries. In Kenya where the null hypothesis of non causality is rejected at 1 percent level, it 
has a relatively large F-Statistics. 
 
Other key microeconomic determinants of nonperforming loans include “equity over total 
liquid assets” and interbank loans over total assets. These variables may also be viewed as 
proxy for moral hazard, to the extent that the recourse to highly-priced short-term loans may 
be an indication of erosion of bank capital and/or a reflection of a relatively low equity base. 
Indeed, in spite of their prohibitively high costs, interbank loans are heavily used during most 
of the crisis period. This variable is shown to Granger-cause nonperforming loans in a 
number of countries, including Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and South Africa. 
The unidirectional causality of interbank loans suggests that the recourse to short-term 
financing at a high price might indeed have exacerbated the scope of banking crisis by 
contributing to a rapid accumulation of nonperforming loans, through the moral hazard 
channel that extended the operations of problems banks, and hence, the cost of the crisis.
35 
The next section investigates the predictability of these variables in explaining the dynamics 
of nonperforming loans using pseudo-panel estimation techniques.  
 
 
IV.  Econometric Estimation and Prediction Model 
 
The estimation is based on pseudo-panel (unbalanced panel) models. A panel is said to be 
unbalanced when observations on different groups do not cover the same time period. Indeed, 
the time series provided by Bankscope is not uniform across the subset of countries. The 
series is shorter for a number of countries, and when the length of the data covers the entire 
reference period for most countries, missing values are observed in a few cases. This 
configuration has motivated the use of pseudo-panel models, which are especially suitable for 
econometric analysis in presence of missing values. There are several specifications for these 
models; this study uses the specification represented by equation (3) below. 
 
it it i it V w ε β λ + + =
'                                                        (3) 
 
Where  it w  is the dependent variable, representing nonperforming loans expressed as a 
proportion of loan loss provisions. The variable  it V  is a non-constant vector of i regressors, 
for N i L , 2 , 1 = . Each cross-section unit is observed for a period t, with  T t , , 2 , 1 L = , and 
varying across countries. The study focuses on fixed effect estimation, which allows the 
                                                           
35 Indeed an extension of operations carried out by troubled banks and financial institutions through access to short-
term financing can only exacerbate the crisis, especially if not accompanied by a systematic operational restructuring of 
banks coupled with portfolios restructuring.    16
constant parameter  i λ  to differ across cross-section units. These effects are derived by 
stacking observations in each group to produce the following representation: 
 
i i i i T i T i T i T i V W , , , ε β τ λ + + =                                             (4) 
 
The model assumes that differences across unit are captured in differences in the constant 
terms. The fixed-effects parameters in equation (4) are therefore estimated by maximizing the 
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Under error variance homogeneity, the above specified likelihood function can be 

































These models are also very flexible and suitable for prediction.
36 In order to further the 
causality analysis and assess the potential impact of microeconomic changes and 
macroeconomic volatility on the performance of the banking sector, the dynamics on these 
loans are investigated in the post-2002 period between 2003 and 2010 under certain 
assumptions (high and low case scenario). The dynamic of these loans is analyzed from the 
prediction model specified by equation (7) below. These predicted values are based on fixed 
effects estimates conditioned upon the estimated coefficients associated with the initial 
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t i V ,  and 
M
t i V ,  are assumed constant over the prediction range. The constant 
fe
i λ ˆ represents the fixed effects estimation for a given country i. The matrix 
m
t i V ,  is comprised 
of micro (banking-level) predictors; the matrix 
M
t i V ,  is comprised of macroeconomic 
                                                           
36 They offer several other advantages in addition to their potential for analysis and the measurement of dynamics; they 
also have the ability to improve the precision of aggregate estimates, and can be used for prediction [Deaton (1997)].    17
predictor variables associated with country i and varying over the time period t. For 
instance, the variables falling under 
M
t i V ,  include real interest rates, per capita GDP and 
inflation, and the ones falling under 
m
t i V ,  include returns on asset, interbank loans and net 
interest margins. In turn, the effects of these variables on nonperforming loans are assessed 
either sequentially, taking each variable at the time, or jointly assuming a concurrent 
variation of micro and macroeconomic variables.
37  
 




t i V , holding all other variables constant at their average and historical values. For 
instance, when the emphasis is on inflationary effects, other macro variables are kept 
constant at their average values over the reference period, while microeconomic variables are 
equal to actual historical data. Likewise, microeconomic effects are assessed by holding the 
macroeconomic variables constant. On the other hand, micro and macroeconomic changes 
are also expected to affect the behavior of nonperforming loans concurrently. These potential 
joint effects are assessed by allowing a simultaneous variation in a set of banking and 
macroeconomic variables over the prediction range. In order to improve the prediction, a 
confidence interval is built around the conditional prediction function using variance 
estimation from the pseudo-panel model. 
 
 
V.  Empirical Results and Macroeconomic Implications 
 
Pseudo-panel models are applied to the full sample and sub-samples of countries in the sub-
panels of non-CFA and CFA countries.
38 The full sample uses 16 cross-sections in a total 
unbalanced panel of 90 observations. The sub-panel of CFA countries uses 7 cross-sections 
in a total number of 46 observations. The sub-panel of non-CFA countries uses 9 cross-
sections in an unbalanced panel setting of 44 observations. The results derived from these 
models are shown in Table III (full sample). The results for the sub-panels of CFA and non-
CFA countries are shown in Tables 5a and 5b in Annexes. Table III summarizes these results 
for the full model with estimated parameters for group specific constant term in the fixed 
effects panel and the coefficients associated with the given explanatory variables.  
 
The pseudo panel models support the fixed effects estimation for the full sample and across 
the sub-panel of CFA and non-CFA countries. The fixed effects approach which takes  i λ to 
be a group specific constant term in the models reject the null hypothesis that these country-
specific intercepts are the same. In fact, the extremely low probability values for the overall 
F-Statistics suggest that fixed effects estimates are more appropriate. For the full sample, the 
F-statistics is about 3.3, much larger than the 5 percent critical value.
39 The differences 
                                                           
37 Clearly, joint effects are more likely; macroeconomic volatility (whether driven by monetary, fiscal or external 
factors) and banks portfolios effects (whether measured by profitability, asset quality and credit risks) are dependent 
upon economic growth and macroeconomic stability and may occur concurrently, affecting the overall dynamic of 
nonperforming loans. 
38 One of the key advantages of panel data is that it provides researchers with greater flexibility in modeling differences 
across countries; they can also be used to study the dynamics of response variable over time. 
39 In the fixed effects model, researchers make inferences conditional upon effects observed in the sample, unlike 
random effect models from which unconditional inferences are made with respect to the entire population.    18
across countries also hold at the 1 percent critical level for the full panel and sub-panel of 
CFA countries which have even lower probability values.  
 
The significance of individual regressors in explaining the dynamics of nonperforming loans 
over the reference period can be tested using the results, t-statistics for each coefficient and 
the corresponding probability values reported in the last column of Tables III (for the full 
panel), Table 5a (sub-panel of CFA countries) and Table 5b (sub-panel of non-CFA 
countries). These results highlight a considerable variation across countries in terms of 
factors affecting the dynamics of nonperforming loans. Macroeconomic volatility seems to 
play a significant role in the rise of impaired loans. The results are consistent for the full 
panel and across the sub-panels of CFA and non-CFA countries. For the full panel, the most 
significant macroeconomic variables include change in effective exchange rate, GDP per 
capita, real interest rate and broad money (M2); a result that is consistent with the correlation 
and causality analysis. These variables have the lowest probability values, well below the 5 
percent level in the three panels.  
 
 
Table III: Determinants of Non-performing Loans across Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Panel Results) 
 
Variables Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
Equity (% of total assets)  23.33263  15.22513  1.532507  0.1307 
Return on asset  -50.91718  50.86922  -1.000943  0.3209 
Net interest margin  -58.76857  19.97444  -2.942189  0.0046 
Net income (% of total revenue)  -1.667656  3.075736  -0.542197  0.5897 
Interbank loans (% of assets) -14.13268  11.01565  -1.282963  0.2044 
Equity (% of liquid assets) -0.004823  0.013545  -0.356049  0.7231 
Growth rate of real GDP  0.209031  0.199804  1.046179  0.2997 
M2 (% of M2)  0.402205  0.236085  1.703640  0.0936 
Inflation  0.094282  0.087111 1.082320 0.2834 
Domestic credits provided by banks (% of GDP) 0.022249  0.049270  0.451571  0.6532 
Domestic credits to  private sector (% of GDP)  -0.115642  0.075262  -1.536523  0.1297 
Real interest rate  0.332117  0.136122  2.439855  0.0177 
Change in real effective exchange  rate  0.113014  0.049648 2.276291 0.0264 
GDP per capita  -0.006843  0.002774  -2.466667  0.0165 
Fixed Effects       
Benin  5.763126     
Botswana  23.23406     
Cameroon  1.129632     
Cape  Verde  -5.674650     
Chad  0.641106     
Cote  d’Ivoire  4.946428     
Ethiopia  -12.76202     
Kenya  -10.09244     
Malawi  -6.678827     
Mali  9.510565     
Rwanda  -0.605327     
Senegal  0.857862     
South  Africa  16.48763     
Swaziland  13.09130     
Togo  1.240846     
Zimbabwe  0.950919     
R-squared  0.609264  Mean dependent var  4.589589 
Adjusted R-squared  0.420408  S.D. dependent var  4.780274 
S.E. of regression  3.639268  Sum squared resid  794.6562   19
F-statistic 3.226080  Durbin-Watson  stat  1.922517 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000063     
 
The variable GDP per capita has a negative sign; a prolonged economic recession and 
downturns coupled with falling per capita GDP is likely to increase the scope of default on 
loans, especially in the most depressed sectors of the economies. In the most extreme cases, 
runs on banks during falling GDP per capita are also accompanied by a rapid decline in per 
capita income in real terms [World Bank (1998)].
40 In this particular case, domestic savings 
may be one of the possible transmission channels from economic downturn to banking crisis. 
In particular, the most affected countries witnessed a dramatic fall in their saving rates over 
the crisis period. For instance, domestic saving which averaged over 25 per cent of GDP 
between 1980 and 1985, fell to about 18 percent between 1996 and 2003 in Cameroon. A 
similar pattern was observed in Kenya, where average saving rates fell from over 16 percent 
of GDP to a little over 8 percent over the same period [World Bank (2004)].
41   
 
The sign associated with GDP per capita is consistent for the full panel and the sub-panel of 
non-CFA countries. In spite of the smaller probability value associated with these two panels, 
it is worth pointing out that the estimated coefficient associated with this determinant is 
extremely low, however, reflecting a possible dual causality between per capita GDP growth 
and impaired loans. Falling per capita GDP and hence, income may erode domestic savings 
and ultimately lead to a banking crisis in a recessionary context. Conversely, a prolonged 
banking crisis may ultimately lead to economic downturns, possibly through the saving-
investment channels. 
 
Among the remaining significant macro variables, real interest rate, broad money supply 
(M2) and changes in real effective exchange rate have positive signs for the full sample, 
suggesting a positive covariance structure with nonperforming loans. More specifically, a 
real exchange rate appreciation may have weakened the performance of export-oriented 
sectors of the economy, and exacerbated the banking crisis, especially for economies which 
are highly dependent on exports. This was the case for a number of countries in the CFA sub-
panel. These countries witnessed a rapid appreciation of their currency in the 80s and early 
90s. When coupled with a deterioration of terms of trade, some of these countries, especially 
Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, the leading coffee and cocoa exporters, were dramatically 
affected by the banking crisis in the 90s, partly as a result of large concentration of loans in 
the depressed agricultural export sectors [Daumont et al. (2004)]. The much smaller 
probability value associated with changes in real effective exchange rate for countries in the 
CFA sub-panel may indeed reflect the relatively strong correlation with nonperforming loans 
and real exchange rates appreciation. 
 
However, for a number of macroeconomic regressors, the probability value is unexpectedly 
high for the full panel and across sub-panels of CFA and non-CFA countries. This is 
especially the case for inflation and domestic credits provided by banks. For the latter 
regressor, the probability largely exceeds the 10 per cent threshold level. Although much 
lower for inflation, it is still relatively high, suggesting that inflationary pressures may not 
have played a critical role in the rapid accumulation of impaired loans in the 1990s. Indeed, 
                                                           
40 In Cameroon for instance, per capita income fell by over 50 percent in real terms [Emini and Fofack (2004)]. 
41 Invariably, banking crises are associated with falling saving rates across Sub-Saharan Africa. Negative trends are 
also observed in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire. In the latter, average saving rates fell from over 21 per cent of 
GDP in the early 80s to less than 16 per cent in the early 90s.    20
even the sub-panel of CFA countries, which witnessed a rapid acceleration of price increase 
in the aftermath of the CFA Franc devaluation has a relatively large probability value, 
suggesting that inflationary pressures may have played a stronger role in the sub-panel of 
non-CFA countries.
42 The Sub-Saharan Africa banking crisis of the 90s was not inflationary-
prone. An inflationary-prone banking crisis would have come with an expansion monetary 
policy, including through a rapid increase of domestic credits. Conversely, the non 
significance of domestic credits could be a reflection of erosion of banks assets and 
resources, which may have lowered the supply and demand curves of money.  
 
For countries in the CFA sub-panel, the most significant variables include broad money 
supply (M2) and change in real effective exchange rate, which have positive signs, again 
suggesting a positive covariance structure with nonperforming loans. An increase in the 
aggregate stock of money and/or real exchange rate appreciation may have contributed to a 
deterioration of banks portfolios in these countries. For most of these countries, the banking 
crisis was coupled with exchange rate crisis, producing a classical Twin Crises.
43 A possible 
transmission channel in this context could run from balance of payments problems to banking 
crisis, possibly through problems loans accumulated from exports promotion to a depressed 
agricultural sector confronted with falling exports as a result of exchange rate appreciation 
coupled with terms of trade deterioration.
44 Also critical are expectations formulated by 
economic agents in the face of sustained balance of payments crises and overvalued 
exchange rate. In anticipation of exchange rate devaluation, runs on banks could be 
exacerbated by increased capital flights and massive outflow of funds [Miller (1995)]. 
 
However, the significance of real exchange rate is not as strong for the sub-panel of non-CFA 
countries, probably reflecting the automatic adjustment process under flexible exchange rates 
regimes. Real interest rate is the most significant macro regressor in this sub-panel. This 
variable is significant at the 10 per cent level, and its estimated coefficient has a positive sign. 
The persistence of high and prohibitive real interest rates can transform a fragile banking 
system into a financial crisis, especially through the accumulation of defaults on loan 
payments and the moral hazard channels. The positive covariance structure between real 
interest rates and nonperforming loans in this sub-panel may reflect the more deregulated 
nature of the banking industry that was initiated in the 80s and resulted in a rapid increase in 
interest rates [Brownbridge (1998)].
45 Moreover, in a context of high inefficiency, where 
formal banks are less competitive than informal financial institution, runs on banks can be 




In order to further assess the linkages between macroeconomic performance and 
nonperforming loans, the pseudo-panel model is applied to the data to predict nonperforming 
loans in the post-2002 period, using actual data. The prediction considers two alternative 
scenarios. The first and high case scenario assumes improved macroeconomic framework. 
                                                           
42 Indeed, inflation contributed to a rapid erosion of banks equity and increased credit risks in Kenya, Nigeria and 
Zambia [Brownbridge (1998)]. 
43 For further details, see Goldfajn and Valdes (1995) and Miller (1995).  
44 For further details on balance of payments problems to banking and financial crisis, see Stoker (1994).  
45 In general, most banking and financial crises have occurred in context of deregulation characterized by abnormally 
high real interest rates. It has been shown that annualized real interest rates are about 13 percentage points higher than 
average observed during normal time on the eve and throughout the crisis [Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996)].  
46 Indeed, low interest rates on bank deposit relative to interest rates on informal financial markets may reduce the 
supply of funds through the banking system and promote disintermediation [Agénor (2000)].   21
Under this scenario, all variables are taken to be constant except GDP per capita, which is 
assumed to be growing at a rate 5 percent higher than the average over the reference period, 
inflation, which is 5 percent lower than its average between 1993 and 2002, over the 
prediction range. Similarly real interest rate is taken to be 5 percent lower than its average 
over the prediction range. Conversely, the second and low case scenario assumes lower per 
capita GDP, which is taken to be 5 percent lower over the prediction range, while inflation is 
taken to be 5 percent higher than its average.  
 
The results, in Figure 3, focus on Benin, Ethiopia and Senegal. The prediction of 
nonperforming loans derived from the models and expressed in percentage of loan loss 
provision highlight the contrast between the high case (left panel) and low case (right panel). 
A negative slope in the trend of nonperforming loans in the left panel is mirrored by a 
positive slope in the right panel, suggesting increased scope of nonperforming loans and a 
deterioration of banks portfolios under increased macroeconomic volatility and economic 
downturns. The results are consistent across countries and over the prediction range 2002-
2010. In Benin, for instance, nonperforming loans fell from over 7% to less than 3% of loans 
loss provision over the prediction range in the high case scenario; they increased to over 10% 
in the worse case scenario.    
 
The preeminence of macroeconomic volatility is also illustrated by the scope of macro 
determinants. For the full panel, the most significant microeconomic predictor is “net interest 
margins”— a measure of banks profitability. With a probability value falling below 0.005, 
this predictor is significant at the one percent level. Its estimated coefficient has a negative 
sign. This is consistent with the correlation analysis and suggests that a decrease in profits, 
possibly via falling interest margins could affect banks portfolios, through a reduction in 
asset. However, this variable is not significant in the full panel. Moreover, none of the 
selected measure of capital adequacy and profitability is significant for the sub-panel of CFA 
countries. The relatively low number of significant banking-level variables in this sub-panel 
further corroborates and reinforces the preeminence of macroeconomic volatility in 
explaining the accumulation of nonperforming loans in these countries.  
 
For the sub-panel of non-CFA countries, the most significant banking-level variables include 
equity-to-total assets and interbank loans. The probability value associated with these 
predictors is less than 10 percent. The coefficient associated with interbank loans has a 
positive sign, suggesting a positive covariance structure with nonperforming loans. Interbank 
loans are generally executed at extremely high and prohibitive rates, and the build-up of these 
loans to meet short-term liquidity needs by banks may have contributed to a rapid increase of 
impaired loans, indirectly through high-priced loans, compounded with moral hazard. The 
recourse to a highly prohibitive short-term liquidity in the form of interbank loans may also 
be a reflection of erosion of banks asset and a relatively low level of equity in problems 
banks. The increase in the level of minimum capital requirements initiated recently across 
Sub-Saharan Africa aims among others at raising banks equity and mitigating short-term 
liquidity crises, and hence reducing the prospects of moral hazard. 
 
Although, raising the level of banks equity may reduce the prospects for short-term liquidity 
crisis, the risk exposure may remain significant, especially in an environment of high 
concentration, where the distribution of loans is heavily skewed towards few sectors and 
economic agents [Brownbridge (1998)]. In this context, economic downturns could still 
affect banks, including the ones which raised their capital base. In the absence of deposit   22
insurance guarantee mechanisms to secure the funds and deposits made by creditors, the 
mobilization of short-term liquidity via interbanks loans could still have a negative effect on 




Figure 3: Predicted Value of Nonperforming Loans in Percent of Loan Loss Provision 
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In order to further illustrate the linkages between microeconomic factors and nonperforming 
loans and the potential impact of the first set of variables on the latter, the pseudo-panel 
model is applied to the data to derive predicted values of nonperforming loans in the post-
2002 period. Similarly, the predictions consider two alternative scenarios. The high case 
scenario assumes higher net interest margins and equity over the prediction range where 
variables are taken to be 5 percent higher than their average value between 1993 and 2002. 
Conversely, the second and low case scenario assumes lower net interest margins and equity 
in percent of liquid assets over the prediction range where they are assumed to take values 
that are about 5 percent lower than the average.  
 
The results, in Figure 4, focus on three countries: Benin, Ethiopia and Togo. The predicted 
values of nonperforming loans derived from the models and expressed in percentage of loan 
loss provision highlight the contrast between the high case (left panel) and low case scenario 
(right panel). Under the high case scenario, the level of nonperforming loans drops sharply in 
the post-2002, and remains virtually constant over the prediction range, at about 5 percent of 
loan loss provision in Benin, and significantly lower in Ethiopia and Togo. That predicted 
value is about 1 percent of loan loss provision in Togo and significantly less in Ethiopia. The 
alternative low case scenario highlights a sharp contrast, with a dramatic increase of impaired 
loans over the prediction range across all countries. For instance, the predicted value account 
for over 10 percent of loans loss provision in Ethiopia and is relatively high in Benin and 
Togo as well.  
 
Figure 5 shows the predicted values of these loans over the prediction range and under 
concurrent changes of macro and microeconomic variables by way of assessing the joint 
effect of macroeconomic volatility and changes in banks portfolios on nonperforming loans. 
Similarly, the prediction models consider the high and low case scenarios. While GDP per 
capita, net interest margins and equity are expected to be growing at a rate 5 percent higher 
than the average over the reference period, interest rate and inflation are assumed to be 5 
percent lower. In the low-case scenario, GDP per capita, net interest margins and equity are 
expected to be declining at a rate 5 percent lower than the average over the reference period, 
and inflation and interest rates are expected to be much higher, about 5 percent higher than 
average over the prediction range.  
 
Figure 5 shows the predicted values of nonperforming loans under a simultaneous change of 
macro and microeconomic variables for the following countries: Benin, Botswana, and 
Ethiopia. Once again, the graphs highlight the contrast between the high case (left panel) and 
low case (right panel). In the high-case scenario of sustained economic growth and 
macroeconomic stability and high interest margins, nonperforming loans are confined to less 
than 2 percent of loan loss provisions in Benin. On the contrary, a dramatic increase in these 
loans is recorded in the low-case scenario (worse case), where the predicted value rises to 
exceed 12 percent of loan loss provision over the prediction range. A similar contrast 
between the high and low-case scenario is observed in Botswana and Ethiopia. The reduction 
in the scope of nonperforming loans in the high-case is mirrored by a rapid increase in the   24
low-case scenario, with impaired loans exceeding 5 and 8 percent of loan loss provision in 






Figure 4: Predicted Value of Nonperforming Loans in Percent of Loan Loss Provision 
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Figure 5: Predicted Value of Nonperforming Loans in Percent of Loan Loss Provision 
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VI. Concluding  Remarks 
 
This paper explores the leading causes of nonperforming loans in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
1990s, using causality and pseudo-panel models. The results show a dramatic increase in 
nonperforming loans and heightened credit risks, with considerable gaps between the sub-
panels of CFA and non-CFA countries. These risks reflect the rapid accumulation of 
impaired loans, and are largely driven by macroeconomic volatility and terms of trade 
deterioration. They are particularly high in the agricultural sector and illustrate the extremely 
high vulnerability of African economies which, in the absence of diversification, remain 
heavily exposed to macroeconomic and exogenous shocks.  
 
In addition to terms of trade deterioration, there are other leading causes of banking crises in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. A Granger-Causality analysis identifies inflation, real interest rate, 
growth rate of GDP per capita, net interest margins, return on assets, interbank loans as other 
possible determinants. The Granger-Causality results are further corroborated with a pseudo-
panel analysis which highlights the preeminence of macroeconomic volatility in explaining 
the proportional variance of these loans. Real exchange rate, interest rates and growth rate of 
GDP per capita are particularly robust and significant. Credit risks tend to be particularly 
high during episodes of sustained economic downturns. Interesting enough, inflation does not 
appear to be particularly significant in explaining the dynamics on nonperforming loans, 
especially in the sub-panel of CFA countries, in spite of post-devaluation inflationary 
pressures of the mid-1990s. Inflationary effects are stronger in the sub-panel of non-CFA 
countries, however. Indeed, in some of these countries, the allocation of a large amount of 
credit to distressed banks by the Central Bank was a source of monetary expansion and 
fueled inflationary pressure, which was partly responsible for the erosion of bank capital. 
 
The cost of nonperforming loans is significant for taxpayers and depositors in numerous 
countries, and especially in the ones which were confronted with balance of payments crises 
and fiscal deficits. The rise of nonperforming loans led to a deterioration of bank assets and 
erosion of their capital. In the short run, numerous banks facing liquidity problems resorted to 
short-term financing in the form of interbank loans. However, the high cost of these loans 
further exacerbated the banking crisis. In a number of countries, it shifted bank lending 
incentives toward imprudently high-risk alternatives, and hence increased runs on banks and 
direct losses to depositors in the absence of a deposit insurance scheme.  
 
While the intermediation functions played by well-managed banks can be a source of 
investment and economic growth, the deterioration of banks and financial systems illustrated 
notably by the rise of credit risks and bank failures has tremendous economic and welfare 
implications for governments and households alike. At the governmental level, it poses 
serious challenges to the pursuit of macroeconomic stability and growth objectives, 
especially in the context of a narrow tax base and growing fiscal deficits. The reduction of 
disposable income following direct losses to depositors in the absence of insurance guarantee 
mechanisms can contribute to a rapid deterioration of welfare, especially when per capita 
income is already low and poverty is widespread. Future research will investigate the welfare 
implications of banking and financial crises in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the direction of 
causality between balance of payments and banking crises, especially in the sub-panel of 
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ANNEXES 
 
Table 1: Ranking of Countries by Equity to Liquid Assets Ratio  
 
Countries Equity/Liquid 
Assets (in percent) 
Rank Ordering  Assessment 
Benin 20.51  2  Low 
Botswana 659.40  13  High 
Cape Verde  22.02  3  Low 
Cameroon 28.94  4  Low 
Chad 42.34  9  Medium 
Côte d’Ivoire  61719.75  16  High 
Ethiopia 38.27  6  Medium 
Kenya 43.92  10  Medium 
Malawi 41.65  8  Medium 
Mali 23419.32  15  High 
Rwanda 39.88  7  Medium 
Senegal 46.06  11  Medium 
South Africa  59.64  12  High 
Swaziland 13.89  1  Low 
Togo 1398.01 14  High 
Zimbabwe 30.45  5  Low 
 
Table 2: Banks Portfolios and Assets by Ownership Structure in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Averages over 1993-2002) 
 



















Benin  1.00  ..  0.011 0.124  1.737 7.127 0.059 0.062 
Botswana  .. .. .. 0.460  1.157  3.653  0.025  0.112 
Cameroon  .. .. .. ..  .. 1.603  0.026  0.063 
Cape Verde  .. .. .. ..  .. .. .. .. 
Chad  .. .. .. ..  .. .. .. .. 
Côte d’Ivoire  .. .. .. ..  1.894  3.333  0.043  0.090 
Ethiopia  1.362 ..  0.136 0.067  1.076 1.917 0.019 0.126 
Kenya  1.539 6.20  0.170 0.163  2.984 6.579 0.115 0.147 
Malawi  .. .. .. 0.211  2.167  0.833  0.031  0.133 
Mali  1.196 10.071  0.110 0.116  1.889 15.289  0.073 0.084 
Rwanda  1.600 1.500 0.166 0.203  2.00  ..  0.069 0.063 
Senegal  ..  1.033 0.109 0.091  2.585 2.713 0.045 0.083 
South Africa  0.695 9.485 0.032 0.550  1.395 4.988 0.044 0.323 
Swaziland  .. .. .. 0.185  1.891  5.500  0.075  0.006 
Togo  1.750 2.25  0.079 0.275  1.486 4.260 0.045 0.067 
Zimbabwe  1.00  ..  0.318 0.454  1.057 3.387 0.044 0.176 
All CFA  1.315 4.452 0.062 0.152  1.918 5.720 0.041 0.075 
All Non-CFA  1.239 0.595 0.164 0.286  1.716 3.599 0.0530  0.136 
All SSA  1.268 1.928 0.113 0.241  1.794 4.578 0.047 0.110 
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Table 3: Correlation Analysis between Nonperforming Loans and Selected Banking and 
Macroeconomic Variables in the Sub-Panel of CFA Countries 
 
Variables  All Banks  State Banks  Private Banks 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES     
  Real GDP growth rate  0.27  -0.74  0.17 
  Real GDP per capita  0.03  -0.52  -0.14 
  M2 in % of GDP  0.35  0.73  0.14 
  CPI inflation rate  -0.09  0.05  -0.10 
  GDP deflator inflation  rate  0.09 0.03 -.030 
  Domestic credit provided by banks (in % of GDP)  0.12  0.72  -0.34 
  Real interest rate  -0.78  ..  .. 
  Interest rate spread  -0.39  ..  .. 
  Real GDP growth rate 2  0.29  -0.74  0.21 
  Real GDP per capita 2  -0.01  -0.52  -0.15 
  CPI inflation rate 2  -0.09  0.05  -0.10 
     
BANKING VARIABLES     
  Equity (in % of total asset)  0.22  -0.60  0.36 
  Return on asset  -0.07  -0.62  -0.38 
  Total deposit (in % of total assets)  -0.18  -0.66  -0.05 
  Total deposit (in % of total  liabilities)  0.32 0.33 -0.36 
  Return on equity  -0.43  -0.83  -0.22 
  Net interest margin  -0.24 -0.89 0.20 




Table 4: Correlation Analysis between Nonperforming Loans and Selected Banking and 
Macroeconomic Variables in the Sub-Panel of non-CFA Countries 
 
Variables  All Banks  State Banks  Private Banks 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES     
  Real GDP growth rate  0.13  -0.18  -0.04 
  Real GDP per capita  -0.44  -0.80  -0.40 
  M2 in % of GDP  -0.36  -0.19  -0.11 
  CPI inflation rate  -0.16  0.46  -0.22 
  GDP deflator inflation rate  -0.07  0.51  -0.27 
  Domestic credit provided by banks (in % of GDP)  0.11  0.34  0.00 
  Real interest rate  0.05  0.00  -0.02 
  Interest rate spread -0.14  0.29  -0.02 
  Real GDP growth rate 2  0.20  -0.18  0.05 
  Real GDP per capita 2  -0.40  -0.76  -0.37 
  CPI inflation rate 2  -0.16  0.46  -0.22 
     
BANKING VARIABLES     
  Equity (in % of total  asset)  -0.20 -0.54 0.09 
  Return on asset  -0.20  -0.67  -0.21 
  Total deposit (in % of total assets)  -0.07  0.15  0.31 
  Total deposit (in % of total  liabilities)  -0.26 -0.08 -0.07 
  Return on equity  -0.17  -0.68  -0.14 
  Net interest margin  -0.28 -0.49 -0.17 
  Net income (in % of total  revenue)  -0.19 -0.49 -0.23 
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Table 5a: Granger Causality Test Results (Macro variables) 
 
H0: X does not Granger Cause Y. H0 is rejected for the following X and Y variables. 
      
X Y  F-test  No  of 
lags 
BENIN      
   Inflation  NPL_LLP  4.649 (*)  1 
   Real Interest rate   NPL_LLP  4.649 (*)  1 
      
BOSTWANA      
   Growth rate of GDP per capita  NPL_LLP (dual) 6.129  (*)  1 
Real interest rate  5.911 (*)  1     NPL_LLP 
Growth rate of GDP per capita 
(dual) 
5.808 (*)  1 
      
CAMEROON      
   Inflation  NPL_LLP  19.775 (***)  1 
NPL_LLP 18.093  (*)  2     Nominal interest rate 
NPL_LLP (dual) 4.131  (*)  1 
   Real interest rate NPL_LLP  19.047  (***)  1 
   Growth rate of GDP per capita  NPL_LLP  37.872 (***)  1 
   Growth rate of real GDP  NPL_LLP  37.774 (***)  1 
   GDP per capita  NPL_LLP  5.302 (*)  1 
   NPL_LLP  Nominal interest rate (dual) 6.145  (*)  1 
      
COTE D’IVOIRE      
   NPL_LLP  Growth rate of real GDP  812.198 (**)  1 
      
ETHIOPIA      
   Growth rate of GDP per capita  NPL_LLP  76.314 (*)  1 
   Growth rate of real GDP  NPL_LLP  79.211 (*)  1 
      
KENYA      
   Inflation  NPL_LLP (dual) 17.327  (**)  1 
   NPL_LLP  Inflation (dual) 9.012  (*)  1 
      
MALI      
   GDP per capita  NPL_LLP (dual) 17326.9  (***)  2 
Inflation 30.831  (***)  1 
Real interest rate 30.831  (***)  1 
Growth rate of GDP per capita  52.177 (*)  2 
Growth rate of real GDP  61.704 (*)  2 
   NPL_LLP 
GDP per capita (dual) 50.451  (*)  2 
      
SENEGAL      
   Inflation  NPL_LLP  28.289 (**)  2 
   Real interest rate  NPL_LLP  28.289 (**)  2 
   GDP per capita  NPL_LLP  11.170 (**)  2 
      
SOUTH AFRICA      
   Nominal interest rate  NPL_LLP (dual) 6.923  (*)  2 
Inflation 8.366  (**)  1     NPL_LLP 
Nominal interest rate (dual) 16.912  (**)  2   33
Nominal interest rate 29.641  (***)  1 
      
SWAZILAND      
   GDP per capita  NPL_LLP  108.120 (*)  1 
      
TOGO      
NPL_LLP 1336.42  (**)  2     Growth rate of GDP per capita 
NPL_LLP 7.738  (**)  1 
NPL_LLP 1076.15  (**)  2     Growth rate of real GDP 
NPL_LLP 8.456  (**)  1 
      
ZIMBABWE      
Growth rate of GDP per capita  6660.01 (***)  2 
Growth rate of real GDP  2621.07 (**)  2 
Growth rate of real GDP  4.629 (*)  1 
   NPL_LLP 
GDP per capita  4.555 (*)  1 
 
Note: (***), (**), and (*) stands for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level. NPL_LLP = Non-performing loans in 
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Table 5b: Granger Causality Test Results (Micro Variables including Moral Hazard 
Variables) 
 
H0: X does not Granger Cause Y. H0 is rejected for the following X and Y variables. 
      
X Y  F-test  No 
of 
lags 
      
BENIN      
Net income in % of total revenue  7.342 (**)  1  NPL_LLP 
Equity/liquid assets  47.774 (***)  1 
Net interest margin  NPL_LLP  291.618 (***)  2 
      
BOSTWANA      
Net interest margin  NPL_LLP  10.589 (**)  1 
      
CAMEROON      
NPL_LLP  Net income in % of total revenue  178.032 (**)  1 
Interbank loans/total assets  NPL_LLP  3365.5 (**)  2 
      
COTE D’IVOIRE      
Interbank loans/total loans  NPL_LLP  53.183 (*)  1 
Interbank loans/total assets  NPL_LLP  86.279 (*)  1 
      
ETHIOPIA      
NPL_LLP  Equity/liquid assets  60.487 (*)  1 
      
KENYA      
Interbank loans/total loans  43.445 (***)  1 
Interbank loans/total assets  12.311 (**)  1 
NPL_LLP 
 
Equity/liquid assets  7.930 (*)  1 
      
MALI      
Net income in % of total revenue  NPL_LLP  26.305 (***)  1 
Return on Assets  NPL_LLP  25.286 (***)  1 
Net interest margin  NPL_LLP  62.474 (*)  2 
Return on Assets  NPL_LLP  713.917 (**)  2 
Interbank loans/total loans  NPL_LLP  5.747 (*)  1 
Interbank loans/total assets  NPL_LLP  6.658 (*)  1 
      
SENEGAL      
NPL_LLP  Net income in % of total revenue  20.982 (**)  1 
Net interest margin  NPL_LLP  7.197 (**)  1 
Return on Assets  NPL_LLP  14.081 (**)  2 
Equity/liquid assets  NPL_LLP  51.677 (***)  1 
      
SOUTH AFRICA      
Net income in % of total revenue  NPL_LLP (dual) 12.218  (**)  1 
Net income in % of total revenue  19.129 (**)  2  NPL_LLP 
  Interbank loans/total assets  184893 (***)  2   35
Equity/liquid assets  141.161 (*)  2 
Equity/liquid assets  8.926 (**)  1 
      
SWAZILAND      
NPL_LLP  Net interest margin  31651.0 (***)  1 
      
TOGO      
NPL_LLP  Equity/liquid assets  1076.96 (**)  2 
      
ZIMBABWE      
NPL_LLP  Net interest margin  212.666 (**)  2 
Equity/liquid assets  NPL_LLP  24.875 (***)  1 
      
 
Note: (***), (**), and (*) stands for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level. NPL_LLP = Non-performing loans in 




Table 6: Determinants of Non-performing Loans in the Sub-Panel of CFA Countries 
(Panel Results) 
 
Variables Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic  Prob. 
Equity (% of total assets)  23.95248 27.89792 0.858576  0.3987
Return on asset  13.93475 172.1980 0.080923  0.9361
Net interest margin  -104.1752 84.34819 -1.235062 0.2283
Net income (% of total revenue)  1.995583 5.833536 0.342088  0.7351
Interbank loans (% of assets) -34.21973 26.26303 -1.302962  0.2045
Equity (% of liquid assets) -0.002063 0.014250 -0.144753  0.8861
Growth rate of real GDP  0.221568 0.338738 0.654099  0.5190
M2 (% of M2)  0.871587 0.499844 1.743720  0.0935
Inflation -2.821116 4.726933 -0.596817  0.5560
Domestic credits provided by banks (% of GDP)  0.025069 0.554686 0.045196  0.9643
Domestic credits to  private sector (% of GDP)  -0.213638 0.847545 -0.252067  0.8031
Real interest rate  -2.280659 4.652920 -0.490157 0.6283
Change in real effective exchange rate  0.281746 0.181876 1.549114 0.1339
GDP per capita  0.004887 0.036531 0.133766  0.8947
Fixed Effects        
Benin 12.65234      
Cameroon 11.79177      
Chad 19.27803      
Cote d’Ivoire  5.727139      
Mali 17.48693      
Senegal 4.977646      
Togo 9.240806      
R-squared  0.730415     Mean dependent var  5.230247
Adjusted R-squared  0.514748     S.D. dependent var  5.725748
S.E. of regression  3.988560     Sum squared resid  397.7153
Log likelihood  -114.8844     F-statistic  3.386762
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Variables Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic  Prob. 
Equity (% of total assets)  45.79182 23.23582 1.970743  0.0621
Return on asset  -58.74186 49.59291 -1.184481  0.2495
Net interest margin  -37.18988 22.67576 -1.640072 0.1159
Net income (% of total revenue)  -2.602749 4.737830 -0.549355  0.5886
Interbank loans (% of assets) 29.39404 15.66541 1.876366  0.0746
Equity (% of liquid assets) -0.292836 0.217901 -1.343895  0.1933
Growth rate of real GDP -0.342472 0.238467 -1.436137  0.1657
M2 (% of M2)  -0.126559 0.154536 -0.818961  0.4220
Inflation -0.090213 0.091323 -0.987852  0.3345
Domestic credits provided by banks (% of GDP)  0.036992 0.048446 0.763563  0.4536
Domestic credits to  private sector (% of GDP)  -0.141431 0.083080 -1.702348  0.1034
Real interest rate 0.238271 0.129710 1.836942  0.0804
Change in real effective exchange rate  0.064114 0.045564 1.407102 0.1740
GDP per capita  -0.003254 0.002259 -1.440636  0.1644
Fixed Effects        
Botswana 23.59307      
Cape Verde  10.79121      
Ethiopia -0.531578      
Kenya 7.497972      
Malawi -12.16939      
Rwanda 0.146271      
South Africa   19.60049      
Swaziland 8.748962      
Zimbabwe 6.672059      
R-squared  0.699200     Mean dependent var  3.919811
Adjusted R-squared  0.384077     S.D. dependent var  3.476945
S.E. of regression  2.728733     Sum squared resid  156.3657
F-statistic  2.218815     Durbin-Watson stat  2.571677
Prob(F-statistic) 0.036398  
 
 
 
 
 